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Anxiety is a subjectively rather unpleasant emotional 
state accompanied by typical physiological symptoms, such 
as increased heart rate, respiration rate, and enhanced elec-
trodermal reactivity. It is usually accompanied by concerns 
and worries as well as the desire to withdraw or hide away 
or otherwise protect oneself, although many different forms 
exist. For some individuals, feelings of anxiety can become 
so predominant and overwhelming that medical and psycho-
logical treatment is needed to help gain control and manage 
everyday life. 
On the other hand, in view of evolution, anxiety is a very 
important and life-saving emotion that prepares body and 
cognition for adaptive actions and reactions. It is only in 
our modern industrial societies, where acute threats to life 
rarely exist in a direct form that can be tackled with physical 
reactions, that anxiety becomes a psychological and medical 
problem, as Robert Sapolsky (1998) has stressed in his book 
“Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers”. It is therefore often for-
gotten, particularly amongst clinicians and patients, but also 
amongst researchers, that anxiety is an adaptive, protective 
behavioral motive that influences our choices and actions in 
a beneficial way. 
Studying conditions of lacking or pathologically reduced 
anxiety can be vital for understanding the functional role 
of anxiety. Among them are sociopathy (Hare, 1965; Hare, 
1998; Flor, Birbaumer, Hermann, Ziegler, & Patrick, 2002) 
and particular forms of brain damage, particularly individu-
als with traumatic injury to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a 
structure that is known to both control and release fear reac-
tions depending on context and higher cognitive evaluation 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Wallis, 2007). 
A vital description of such cases has been given by 
Damasio (1994): The patients show impulsiveness, irrita-
bility, reduced emotion control, lack of tact and sensitivity, 
lack of steadiness and reliability, difficulties in planning and 
goal-related behavior. As the OFC is one of the last brain 
structures to mature during ontogenesis, children and ado-
lescents often display behaviors that are reminiscent to that 
of these patients (Spear, 2000).
Research investigating the underlying cognitive and 
brain dynamics has stressed the fact that patients with dam-
age to the OFC are less able or less willing than healthy 
individuals to make predictions about future rewards and 
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The role of anxiety in decision-making
MARTINA KIRSCH and SABINE WINDMANN
Over the past decade, many studies have shown that individuals with reduced sensitivity for risk due to trau-
matic brain injury in orbital parts of the prefrontal cortex tend to ignore the long term outcomes of their behavioral 
actions (the same holds true for individuals with socio-/psychopathy). Instead, these individuals merely base deci-
sions on anticipated immediate gains, similar to impulsive choice in children. The Iowa gambling task has been 
designed specifically to measure this behavioral tendency. We used this task to investigate a state opposite to that of 
impulsiveness and carelessness, namely enhanced anxiety and risk intolerance. We expected beneficial effects on 
decision-making, especially since high anxiety in both healthy populations and patients with anxiety disorders has 
been linked with enhanced activation of orbitofrontal cortex. Our most important finding is that intolerance towards 
uncertainty is indeed positively correlated with overall performance on the Iowa gambling task in a sample of adults 
as well as with anxiety in a sample of children. Results illustrate the protective functions of anxiety and risk aver-
sion, and their positive long-term effects on decision-making. These motives seem to enable individuals to better 
consider future consequences of their actions, and to switch from previously reinforced behaviors to alternative 
behaviors when contingencies change. 
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punishments, and instead take into account only immedi-
ate outcomes of their actions when making decisions. This 
tendency has been termed “myopia for the future” (Bechara, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 2000), and seems to be accompanied 
by a reduced ability to switch action plans in accordance 
with long-term experiences (Fellows & Farah, 2005). That 
is, the patients choose behavioral options that appear ad-
vantageous at first sight, with little regard for the potential 
risks and long-term consequences involved, which leads to 
misinvestment and aimlessness, alongside massive social 
problems. 
A behavioral task that has been designed specifically to 
measure the described cognitive deficit is the Iowa gambling 
task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). The 
task is a card playing game in which subjects are asked to 
draw cards from four decks in order to win points. In the 
original version of the task, two decks of cards (A and B) are 
associated with 100 points each while the other two decks 
contain cards that win only 50 points (C and D). However, 
what the player needs to learn over a number of trials is that 
relatively many of the cards from the 100 point decks are 
also associated with significant losses, in such a way that 
the long term balance is negative if a player continues to 
draw from those decks (on average, -25 points per card). In 
contrast, the cards from the 50 point decks are associated 
with fewer (or less significant) losses such that the long-
term expectancy value is positive (25 points per card). This 
means that although it seems advantageous at first sight to 
draw from the 100 point decks (A and B), further experi-
ences should tell a player that they can only win points if 
they draw from the 50 point decks (C and D). They there-
fore have to inhibit the temptation to draw from those decks 
and instead choose cards from the other two decks in order 
to maximize their balance. A computerized version of the 
task exists that entails some more dynamic variation in the 
payoffs (Iowa Gambling Task TM, Psychological Assessment 
Resources Inc., Lutz, FL).
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997) have 
hypothesized that patients with damage to the ventrome-
dial prefrontal (or medial orbitofrontal) cortex are unable 
to learn the Iowa gambling task because they are missing 
the intact brain structures needed to process signals from 
the body periphery and/or from other brain structures like 
the amygdala informing them about hidden or future risks 
involved in choice options. They have based this hypothesis 
on the observation that patients with damage to the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex fail to develop electrodermal skin 
reactions when drawing cards from the risky decks (C and 
D). In a sense, the patients are lacking sensitivity for risk 
or some form of predictive anxiousness when making their 
choices. Interestingly, despite their disadvantageous behav-
ior, about half of the patients do have conscious insight into 
the rules of the game, and can report on what chances the 
decks involve (Bechara et al., 1997). However, when asked 
why they draw from the risky decks nonetheless, they an-
swer that they just do not care. Other researchers have found 
similar deficits in patients characterized by social and im-
pulse control deficits such as substance abuse, pathological 
gambling, and psychopathy (Forbush et al., 2008; Hanson, 
Luciana, & Süllwold, 2008; van Honk, Hermans, Putman, 
Montagne, & Schutter, 2002).
From a descriptive point of view, the characteristics of 
those patients is the opposite of what would be expected from 
individuals with heightened anxiety, at least with regards to 
free floating anxiety that has no specific trigger (like specific 
phobias). Individuals with these forms of anxiety care more 
about risks and potential losses than do healthy people; they 
worry enormously about making the right decisions, and 
they are highly concerned about what the future will entail, 
a tendency that has been described as an attentional bias 
towards threat by modern theories of anxiety (Clark, 1986; 
Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; McNally, 1994, 
1995, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). 
Clinical forms such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD, 
APA, 1994) are further characterized by prevailing somatic 
symptoms, including increased heart rate, sweating, head-
aches, sleeplessness, and muscle tension. In specifying these 
criteria, Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, and Freeston (1998) 
described intolerance of uncertainty (IU), beliefs about wor-
ries, poor problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance as 
main features of GAD. IU was found as particularly useful 
in discriminating GAD patients from unaffected individu-
als. Thus, these patients experience an abundance of worries 
about the future as well as somatic signals relating to pre-
dicted risk and danger, and can therefore be hypothesized 
to display different decision-making patterns. Specifically, 
it should be easier for them to perceive, consider, and in-
tegrate somatic signals with expectations about future out-
comes in the decision-making process, which should help 
them to avoid choice options that are disadvantageous in the 
long run and therefore lead to better outcomes in the Iowa 
gambling task. Such a hypotheses is indirectly supported by 
data from recent imaging studies suggesting that patients 
with anxiety disorders show abnormal activation patterns in 
OFC (Domschke et al., 2008; Monk et al., 2006; Monk et 
al., 2008). The patients tend towards higher activation or 
higher involvement of OFC regions during task perform-
ance, contrary to patients with OFC lesions or sociopathy. 
Healthy individuals under induction of “worry” show the 
same tendency towards heightened activation of orbitofron-
tal structures (Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Wong, 2005) 
as do individuals who are at high risk for anxiety and de-
pression when reading negative emotional words (Wolfens-
berger et al., 2008). Incidentally, these results confirm the 
notion that there is a continuum between normal (state) and 
pathological (trait) forms of anxiety, in line with most mod-
ern theories and findings (e.g., Endler & Kocovski, 2002; 
Hansell & Damour, 2008).
Direct empirical evidence about the impact of anxi-
ety on decision-making processes as assessed by the Iowa 
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gambling task is lacking. Two studies have investigated the 
influence of depression, which is often comorbid with anxi-
ety, and found conflicting results, namely superior perform-
ance of the patients in one (Smoski et al., 2008) and inferior 
performance in the other study (Must et al., 2006) Prelimi-
nary studies from our own laboratory in patients with panic 
disorder did not find any differences between patients and 
healthy controls (Guse, 2006; Wischniewski, 2006); how-
ever, these studies did not use the computerized version of 
the task and therefore may not be comparable to the other 
studies. A very recent study by Miu, Heilman, and Houser 
(2008) found increased somatic activity in individuals with 
high trait anxiety, as expected, but this activity was am-
biguous as it did not specifically signal risk, which led to 
impaired performance on the Iowa gambling task by these 
individuals compared to individuals with low trait anxiety, 
contrary to our above reasoning. However, another study 
(Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara,  2007) in which 
speech anxiety was induced prior to testing performance on 
the Iowa gambling task did find that that this form of stress 
enhanced performance on the task, but only in female par-
ticipants (while the opposite was true for male participants). 
Yet another study by Garon, Moore, & Waschbusch (2006) 
found a sample of anxious and depressed children with 
ADHD to learn the Iowa gambling task more easily than 
nondepressed and nonanxious children with ADHD. Thus, 
a number of results point towards enhanced performance on 
the task when anxiety is involved, although almost as much 
evidence for the opposite hypothesis exists.
While superior performance of individuals with high 
anxiety could be easily explained in the above theoretical 
terms, what could be the reason behind inferior performance 
of individuals with high anxiety? Perhaps it is too simplistic 
to assume that high somatic activity and heightened activa-
tion of OFC will lead to enhanced risk perception and more 
advantageous decision-making. After all, the peripheral and 
the central nervous systems do not function like a muscle 
whose degree of activation determines degree of contrac-
tion and thereby motor performance. Instead, their activity 
is based on neural network processing whose performance 
relies on efficacy and reliability of information transfer and 
integration. Thus, any deviation from normal, be it hyper- or 
hypofunctional, will lead to disturbances in performance. 
A theory that favours this point of view is the theory of 
psychobiology by Lungwitz (1955; Becker, 1993), a Ger-
man psychiatrist who has sometimes been described as the 
unknown founder of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. He de-
scribed clinical anxiety as a consequence of hypertrophy of 
specific neuronal cells which mediate the feeling of “being 
cornered, beset, of compulsion, of inhibition, of astonish-
ment, of defiance, of withdrawal, shame, shyness, careful-
ness, care, etc.” (Becker, 1993, p. 41). In his conception, 
hypertrophy of those cells - today probably better described 
as ‘hyperactivity’ (e.g., excessive firing, lower firing thresh-
olds) - leads to malfunctioning (not superior functioning) of 
the entire anxiety reflex system, including cognition, feel-
ing, and bodily reactions. The condition lets the patients’ 
cognitive styles and attitudes towards the world regress to-
wards a more self-absorbed and less sophisticated way of 
thinking that Lungwitz described as ‘infantilistic’, as if it 
were immature or underdeveloped. Patients with anxiety 
disorder are therefore expected to think and behave similar-
ly to children, which may or may not fit with today‘s view 
of overactive OFC in anxiety and immature OFC in chil-
dren. Clearly, Lungwitz had to be lacking much of today’s 
knowledge about neural information processing, but at a 
very functional-descriptive level, his conception describes a 
testable hypothesis about parallel thinking styles in children 
and patients with anxiety disorders (c.f., Kalin, Shelton, & 
Davidson, 2007).  
Lungwitz further proposed that neuroses of childhood 
do not differ in principle from neuroses of adults: Accord-
ing to his expectations, neurotic children with high anxiety 
show a yet more “infantilistic” and evolutionarily “primi-
tive” thinking style than do their healthy peers because of 
their underdeveloped anxiety reflex systems (see Becker, 
1993, p. 107). Thus, not only do the effects of neurotic anxi-
ety and young age lie on the same dimension (as they both 
rely on immature “reflex systems”), they are also presumed 
to have additive effects. When applied to the Iowa gam-
bling task, the theory would predict that neurotically anx-
ious children perform inferior to both healthy children and 
adults with anxiety disorders, who in turn perform inferior 
to healthy adults. 
The present study tested the impact of anxiety on per-
formance in the Iowa gambling task in children and adults 
with varying degrees of anxiety ranging from low to clini-
cally relevant using correlational analyses. We included a 
number of selected personality traits and intellectual abili-
ties in the analyses, and controlled for confounding variables 
such as age, depression, and gender by statistical means. We 
preferred this dimensional approach to a between-groups 
design as we find it more powerful and illustrative and less 
dependent on sample sizes than subgroups. The approach 
is also theoretically more appropriate as modern theories 
of anxiety (Endler & Kocovski, 2002; Hansell & Damour, 
2008) as well as the theory of psychobiology by Lungwitz 
(1955) hold a dimensional perspective onto mental illnesses 
assuming a continuum between healthy and ill rather than a 
categorical one with discrete boundaries.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty adults (21 female, mean age: 48 years, range 23-
80) were investigated. They were recruited via newspaper 
advertisements, local self-help groups, local psychothera-
pists and local clinical institutions. The newspaper ad asked 
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for volunteers who experience high degrees of worry and 
general anxiety. Additionally, seven volunteers without anx-
iety and worries participated. Participants were excluded 
from participation if they had clinically relevant depression. 
One participant was dropped after her data were acquired. 
This person had a BDI score of 37 and was a clear outlier 
(more than 3 SD above the mean). In addition, she did not 
learn the gambling task at all; she started off with a balance 
of approximately 0 in the first block of 20 trials and ended 
up drawing cards only from “bad” decks over the last 40 tri-
als (resulting in a maximally negative balance of -20 in the 
two final blocks); suggesting to us that she had not been able 
or willing to follow the instructions. 
All participants received reimbursement of their travel 
expenses plus the money they won in the gambling game 
(ranging from 5 € through 20 €). 
The children sample consisted of 67 children (33 fe-
male, mean age 10.43 years, range 7-14) recruited via local 
communities and sports groups while no specific anxiety 
levels were targeted. Children were allocated to two parallel 
groups to perform the two versions of the gambling task in 
different order. The group which played the original version 
first consisted of 34 children (18 female, mean age 10.35, 
range 7-14), the other group consisted of 33 children (17 
female, mean age 10.52, range 7-14). The children were in-
vestigated after written informed consent had been obtained 
from their parents. The parents of the children received an 
expense allowance of 5 €. After performance, the children 
were offered to choose a little gift from one of three boxes 
which contained little toys. The three boxes were graded ac-
cording to the amount of points won in the gambling game.
Materials
The adults played a computer game that we developed 
in accordance with the computerized Iowa gambling task. 
Electrodermal activity (results not reported) was taken us-
ing the “Kölner Mini Vitaport System” (Ingenierbüro Beck-
er, Karlsruhe, Germany). Anxiety levels and risk aversion 
was measured using a German Version of the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale Short Form (IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, 
& Asmundson, 2007), provided by the specialized GAD 
outpatient clinic at the University of Dresden, the German 
Version of the Beck-Depression Inventory II (Hautzinger, 
Keller, & Kühner, 2006) the German Versions of the Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, 
& Borkovec, 1990) provided by Stöber (1995), the Worry 
Domain Questionnaire (WDQ, Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 
1992), German short version (Stöber & Joormann, 2001), 
and the German version (Ehlers, 1986) of the Anxiety Sen-
sitivity Index (ASI, Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 
1986).
The children played two different versions of the com-
puterized version of the Iowa gambling task. The first ver-
sion was a computerized adaptation of the original task. To 
make it more appropriate for children, the original amounts 
of gains and losses were divided by 25 so that the amounts 
were reduced, but the relations were the same. Unlike the 
adults, children were not only asked to make as many points 
as they could, they were also given a cover story in which 
they were asked to help a little magician who needed some 
magic balls to achieve his witcheries. Reward values of 4 
(decks A and B) and 2 points (decks C and D), and punish-
ment values ranging from 0-50 points for disadvantageous 
(“bad”) desks and 0-10 points for the advantageous (“good”) 
desks were administered. In the second version we used a 
shuffled version of the IGT as described by Fellows and Fa-
rah (2005) which was adapted for children in the same way. 
In this shuffled version, significant losses occur earlier than 
in the original version to prevent the establishment of initial 
preferences for bad decks. With this version, Fellows and 
Farah (2005) found no performance deficits in patients suf-
fering from OFC lesions. Presenting this shuffled version to 
children should thus enable us to differentiate between the 
effect of immature OFC and the effect of anxiety per se on 
task performance.
Rewards and punishment values were displayed for 6 
sec after which participants could choose the next deck. The 
total balance was presented at the bottom of the screen in 
addition to the current trial outcome. Below the balance, a 
winning bar was shown that turned to green when the bal-
ance was positive and to red when it was negative. The 
bar grew in either direction, left or right, depending on the 
number of points won or lost. After 100 trials, the program 
ended and the overall outcome was displayed.
Anxiety levels and risk aversion was measured using 
the Kinder Angst Test II (KAT II; Thurner & Tewes, 2000). 
Other tests that were completed by the children in order to 
obtain a gross estimate of intellectual capabilities were the 
Connect-the-Numbers Test (Zahlen-Verbindungs-Test, ZVT, 
Oswald & Roth,1997) and the Digit Span Task measuring a 
form of working memory (WISC III), both taken from the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler, 1991). 
Procedures
After having signed the informed consent, adult par-
ticipants were interviewed about their symptoms using free 
questionnaires and a short version of a standardised German 
diagnostic interview (Mini-DIPS; Margraf, 1994), and also 
filled out the questionnaires. Before the experiment started, 
electrodes were placed on subjects’ palms and connected 
to the Mini-Vitaport. Finally, participants were shown the 
gambling task on the computer. They were instructed to try 
to make as many points as possible. One session took ap-
proximately 90 minutes.  
The procedure varied for the children only in that the 
children were not interviewed before the experiment and 
that they played either one of the two versions of the gam-
bling task described above. After task completion the chil-
dren filled out the questionnaires. 
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of all dependent variables can be 
found in Table 1. A t-test indicated that children’s overall 
performance was similar to that of adults (t(94)=1.21, n.s.). 
Note, however, that the task versions may not be directly 
comparable as their task version was slightly modified (and 
made simpler) to help them understand the instructions. 
For both samples, to investigate the relationship between 
the various cognitive facets of anxiety and decision-making, 
we computed correlations between the psychodiagnostic 
questionnaire measures and the total performance score of 
the Iowa gambling task (i.e., number of cards drawn from 
advantageous decks [C or D] minus number of cards drawn 
from disadvantageous decks [A or B] across all 100 trials). 
As the adult sample was rather small, we additionally calcu-
lated non parametric correlations (Spearman’s Rho). How-
ever, because results were almost identical, we report only 
Pearson’s r here. Potential confounds such as age and gen-
der were taken into account as indicated. 
For the adults, we did not find any significant correlation 
between PSWQ, ASI or BDI and the total performance score 
in the Iowa gambling task, but intolerance of uncertainty 
(IUS) did correlate positively with total gambling perform-
ance score (r=.377, N=29, p<.05), as did the WDQ (r=.404, 
N=29, p<.04). However, most of the other correlations 
turned out significant as well when gender differences were 
taken into account by means of a covariate, as male partici-
pants had significantly higher scores (M=24.2, SD=24.17) 
than did women (M=-1.90, SD=24.27; t(27)=2.69, p<.05). 
Now there were significant correlations between the total 
performance score in the Iowa gambling task and PSWQ 
(r=.397, df=26, p<.04), WDQ (r=.377, df=26, p<.05), ASI 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the dependent measures  
for the two samples
Adult Sample (N=29) Mean (SD)
Total Gambling Score 6.21 (26.79)
Anxiety Sensitivity Score (ASI) 20.21 (10.23)
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI) 11.86 (7.84)
Worry Domain Questionnaire (WDQ) 14.76 (8.66)
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 50.44 (12.16)
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale Short Form (IUS-12) 34.52 (8.87)
Children Sample (N=67)
  Sample: Original Version (N=34)
KAT Anxiety Score 3.59 (2.72)
Total Gambling Score 2.53 (13.79)
WCST digit span forward 6.56 (1.77)
WCST digit span backward 5.29 (1.71)
WCST block span forward 8.41 (1.51)
WCST block span backward 8.67 (1.62)
Connect-The-Numbers (ZVT) 102.21 (16.92)
  Sample: Shuffled Version (N=33)
KAT Anxiety Score 3.82 (2.74)
Total Gambling Score -4.30 (31.80)
WCST digit span forward 6.67 (2.04)
WCST digit span backward 5.57 (1.62)
WCST block span forward 8.72 (1.72)
WCST block span backward 8.15 (1.58)
Connect-The-Numbers (ZVT) 102.51 (19.90)
Table 2
Correlation matrix for the adult group
Total performance  
in the Iowa gambling task Age Gender PSWQ WDQ ASI IUS_D_12
Age .098.057 –





































Note. Numbers in italics reflect the correlations after controlling for gender effects. All correlation coefficients are Pearson’s r. Significance (2-tailed): 
**p<.01, *p<.05.
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(r=.378, df=26, p<.05), BDI II (r=.385, df=26, p<.05) and 
a trend for the IUS (r=.359, df=26, p=.06). This means that 
anxiety and depression did indeed enhance gambling per-
formance when gender differences were taken into account. 
The correlations are shown in Figure 1.
For the children we found a modest correlation (r=.234, 
N=67, p=.057), between the KAT anxiety test score and total 
Iowa gambling performance score when we combined both 
versions. However, when looking at the original version 
alone, the significance disappeared (r=-.144, N=34, n.s.). 
In contrast, when looking at the shuffled version alone, the 
correlation became stronger (r=.440, N=33, p<.02). It made 
no difference for this correlation (nor for the nonsignificant 
other ones) whether age was taken into account by means 
of a covariate (i.e., r=.437, df=30, p<.02). Age alone cor-
related significantly with performance in the original ver-
sion (r=.429, N=34, p<.02), but not in the shuffled version 
(r=.098, N=33, n.s.). All correlations are shown in table 3.
IGT performance scores of both, children and adults, 
were approximately normally distributed, as confirmed by 
Figure 1. Correlations between the questionnaire scales measur-
ing anxiety and depression and performance in the Iowa gam-
bling task. Note that gambling scores have been z-transformed to 
eliminate gender differences
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests which showed only nonsignifi-
cant deviations from normal distribution. The only exception 
was the original version of the IGT in the children sample; 
but this variable did not correlate with KAT anxiety scores 
anyway and hence was not relevant for our hypotheses. 
DISCUSSION
We have investigated the role of anxiety in decision-
making in samples of children and adults using the Iowa 
gambling task which has been designed to test orbitofron-
tal function. The most interesting and novel finding of our 
two experiments is that various facets of anxiety seem to 
have a beneficial effect on gambling behaviour in the Iowa 
gambling task, albeit not a very strong one. This adds to 
previous literature which was not clear and more indirect 
on this point (Garon et al., 2006; Miu et al. 2008; Preston 
et al., 2007). 
Our results show a modest but significant association 
between anxiety measures and total performance scores in 
both samples, with anxiety rendering the children perform 
better (i.e., more like normal adults), and anxious adults per-
form better than nonanxious individuals. However, in the 
children sample, the correlation between anxiety and per-
formance was mostly based on the results of the shuffled 
version. Since Fellows and Farah (2005) showed that the 
shuffled version is less sensitive to OFC dysfunction, this 
result might indicate that anxiety has an effect on gambling 
performance that is independent of OFC maturation. This in-
terpretation is further supported by our observation that the 
correlation between gambling performance and children age 
(as an indirect measure of OFC maturation) was significant 
only for the original version. Conversely, the correlation be-
tween gambling score and anxiety in the shuffled version re-
mained unaffected when effects of age were controlled for. 
We therefore suggest that the positive effects of anxiety on 
gambling performance in our study may be independent of 
OFC functioning, contrary to our prior speculations. 
In the adult sample, significant correlations with total 
performance scores were found for IUS (intolerance of un-
certainty) and WDQ (worry domain) test scores. Further-
more, when statistically controlling for sex differences, 
significant correlations with performance were also found 
for the PSWQ (Penn state worry questionnaire) score, the 
ASI (anxiety sensitivity) total score and the BDI II (Beck 
depression inventory) score (although clinically relevant 
depression was an exclusion criterion). Naturally, the emo-
tions assessed by those scales are somewhat interrelated, 
but we find the consistency of the associations across the 
range of measures and across both samples nonetheless con-
vincing as these were independent individuals. Moreover, 
the consistency of the association across various levels of 
anxiety ranging from nonanxious over highly anxious (but 
still within a normal range) to clinically anxious individuals 
suggests that a dimensional view of pathological anxiety is 
appropriate – one that does not make a segregation between 
clinically anxious and healthy individuals but assumes the 
existence and graded impact of varying degrees of anxi-
ety in-between these two poles (Endler & Kocovski, 2002; 
Hansell & Damour, 2008). 
Intermediate forms of anxiety are referred to as ‘nerv-
ousness’ in the conception of Lungwitz (1955). Our main 
finding of anxiety as beneficial for decision-making in a pro-
totypical gambling task is at odds with the theory of Lung-
witz (1955) who stated that heightened anxiety will make 
individuals think and behave more ‘infantilistic’. Naturally, 
it is not clear from his writing what areas of the neocortex he 
presumed to be functionally or microstructurally deficient 
in anxiety; hence we do not know whether his hypotheses 
referred to OFC mediation or other brain regions. 
It is noteworthy that our scales in the adult sample meas-
ured aspects of worrying and uncertainty rather than physi-
cal anxiety symptoms. Further studies on the relationship 
between anxiety and decision-making should zoom in on 
this differentiation rather than treat anxiety as a unitary con-
cept. In addition, preliminary studies at the University of 
Bochum (Germany) in patients with panic disorder have not 
found any differences between patients and healthy controls 
(Guse, 2006;  Wischniewski, 2006), further suggesting that 
it is not so much the somatic (or ‘sensile’ in the Lungwitz 
Table 3
Correlation matrix for the children group
Total IGT performance  
(combined)
Total IGT performance  
(original)
Total IGT performance  
(shuffled) Age Gender KAT anxiety test























Note. Numbers in italics reflect the correlations after controlling for age effects. All correlation coefficients are Pearson’s r. Significance (2-tailed): *p <.05.
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terminology) component of anxiety that helps in decision-
making, but a more cognitive component. In any case, our 
results show that anxiety can and does have adaptive value 
in situations that are commonplace in our modern society 
and that are mimicked by the Iowa gambling task: namely 
those that involve conflicting financial outcomes, and that 
consumers, customers, clients, traders, and investors fre-
quently find themselves in. 
In direct comparison between the two groups, we found 
that performance of children was similar to that of the adults. 
This was expected as their task was easier since it involved 
only fixed amounts instead of dynamically adopted payoffs. 
However, our adult sample was very heterogeneous in terms 
of age ranging from 23 to 80 years which may have ad-
ditionally contributed to their relatively poor performance, 
given that Denburg, Tranel, and Bechara (2005) found that 
elderly participants tend not to shift from bad desks to good 
ones after some trials. Also in line with some previous re-
sults (Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik, & Cadet, 2004; Overman, 
2004; Reavis & Overman, 2001) was our finding that men 
outperformed women in the adult group. In the sample of 
children, this difference was not observed. It is possible that 
sex hormones that come into play only during and after pu-
berty are responsible for this gender effect.
As a final remark, we find it unlikely that intelligence has 
confounded our results. First, we have not found any asso-
ciation between the cognitive abilities tests (Connect-The-
Numbers and working memory, i.e., digit span in the WISC) 
and gambling performance in the children sample, and sec-
ond, because previous studies have found higher education 
to be associated with reduced (not enhanced) performance on 
the Iowa gambling task (Evans, Kemish, &Turnbull, 2004). 
However, some gross analyses on educational status that we 
performed in the adult group found no correlation between 
education and performance. Hence, if anything, we believe 
that intelligence may be detrimental to task performance. 
While the structure of the gambling task is rather simple, 
more intelligent individuals tend to wonder too much about 
more sophisticated (and actually non-existing) patterns be-
hind the card sequences, and try to develop strategies that 
are more complex than appropriate. In contrast, what might 
drive individuals with high anxiety towards better perform-
ance is their specific focus on (or sensitivity to) negative 
outcomes, so that they avoid the high risk decks, even at the 
cost of lower immediate gains. It would be very interesting 
to investigate these individuals with the inverted variant of 
the gambling task (see Bechara et al., 2000) wherein rela-
tively low immediate losses are set into conflict with poten-
tially large rewards. Our prediction would be that anxiety 
does not help in this case, first because there is no big risk 
that needs to be avoided, and second, because anxiety does 
not entail a particular sensitivity towards future rewards. 
Notably, patients with orbitofrontal lesions are impaired on 
both types of the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., 2000), 
suggesting that they are generally “myopic” for events in 
the future rather than solely for negative events. It is an open 
(but empirically testable) question whether this is different 
in patients with anxiety disorder. 
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